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A Promise Realized? A Critical Review of
Accountable Care Organizations Since
the Enactment of the Affordable Care Act
JEAN PHILLIP SHAMI*
As the six-year anniversary of the passage of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) comes to a close, a critical review
of one of the key inventions of the ACA—Accountable Care
Organizations (“ACOs”)—is timely as part of the greater
narrative around affordable, quality health care in America.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the statutory creation, philosophy and vision, and organizational structure of
ACOs in the context of the passage of the ACA in 2010. Then,
it will critically review ACOs from three perspectives based
on the ACO model’s mission to provide better care for more
people at a lower cost. The first critical perspective will address the concept of “bending the cost curve” to understand
whether ACOs have effectively reduced costs, both statutorily and practically. The second critical perspective will consider the “quality of care” framework used to “grade”
ACOs, questioning whether this grading system is effective—or even sufficient—to improve the quality of health
care. The third critical perspective will evaluate whether
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ACOs have enabled greater access to care for all Americans—an aspiration for a renewed American health care
system—or simply intensified the marginalization of access
to health care in this country. It is undeniable that the ACO
model of care could greatly impact health outcomes in the
United States by restructuring the delivery system of patient
care.
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A. ACOs: The “Ivory Towers” of the U.S. Health Care
Industry? ..........................................................................354
B. Medicaid and ACOs: An Opportunity for Partnership? ..355
CONCLUSION.................................................................................357
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most meaningful contribution of the
ACO model is that it gives providers a reason to
change the culture of medicine. It asks providers
across specialties to work together and coordinate
care in a way that was not rewarded under fee-forservice. It asks organizations to stitch the separate
pieces of the patient’s care trajectory together
through teamwork. In the long run, this may be the
most intangible but substantive legacy that the ACO
model provides. Under a single, collective contract at
the organizational level, providers are quite literally
in it together. If providers can break down silos, [offer] better care coordination, and manage population
health with a collective vision towards keeping patients healthy, the ACO paradigm would be able to
claim a profound achievement. Such changes, however, will take time and they are not guaranteed.1
On March 23, 2010, as President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),2 politicians and
the public reacted both positively and negatively. Proponents rejoiced as they believed the ACA was a step forward towards universal health care coverage in the United States.3 Opponents, however,
1

Zirui Song, Accountable Care Organizations: Early Results and Future
Challenges, 21 J. CLINICAL OUTCOMES MGMT. 364, 364–71 (Aug. 2014).
2
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3
Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations—The
Proposed Rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1,
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maintained a high cry that the ACA violated individual liberties,
portraying the ACA as the manifestation of “a larger and larger government, more and more intrusive in your life . . . that potentially
causes you to lose the insurance that you like . . . .”4 Amidst these
political and societal tensions, the United States health care industry
experienced monumental shifts in health care coverage, organizational and funding structures, and a fundamental understanding of
the meaning of “health” in the United States.5 As policymakers and
health care providers alike seek to achieve the “Triple Aim”6—composed of “[i]mproving the patient experience of care . . . ; [i]mproving the health of populations; and [r]educing the per capita cost of
health care”7—through the implementation of the various provisions
of the ACA, one major organizational structure has garnered special
attention: the Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”) models of
care.
Defined as “groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care
providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high
quality care to the Medicare patients they serve,”8 the ACO models
4 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1103602
(“Whatever form ACOs eventually take, one thing is certain: the era of fragmented care delivery should draw to a close. Too many Medicare beneficiaries—
like many other patients—have suffered at the hands of wasteful, ineffective, and
poorly coordinated systems of care, with consequent costs that are proving unsustainable.”).
4
Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney: I Will Repeal Obamacare, P2012.ORG (June
28, 2012), http://www.p2012.org/issues/hc062812oppose.html; see also Robert
B. Leflar, Reform of the United States Health Care System: An Overview, 10 U.
TOKYO J.L. & POL. 44, 49 (2013) (Opponents of the ACA argued that the law
“infringed on personal liberty and was beyond Congress’s power.”).
5
See generally PPACA, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6
Inst. for Healthcare Improvement, The IHI Triple Aim Initiative, INST.
HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/engage/initiatives/tripleaim/Pa
ges/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter IHI Triple Aim] (describing a framework “to optimiz[e] health system performance” through the “Triple
Aim.”).
7
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6. See also Berwick, supra note 3, at 1 (“[The
ACO’s] purpose is to foster change in patient care so as to accelerate progress
toward a three-part aim: better care for individuals, better health for populations,
and slower growth in costs through improvements in care.”).
8
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan.
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has been (skeptically)9 characterized as an organizational model
likely to result in major cost savings for the Medicare program—
and the American health care system as a whole.10 While many studies generally paint a positive picture of the impact ACOs have had
since their inception under the ACA,11 several questions remain unanswered.
This Comment hopes to shed light on the current state of the
ACO model of care, while pointing to the remaining unanswered
questions. In so doing, this Comment posits that, with respect to
ACOs, the “Triple Aim”12 has been undone by the disproportionate
emphasis on “restraining costs.”13 This financial focus overshadows
the two remaining priorities of American health reform: improving
quality of care and facilitating access to care through the ACO
11, 2016), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/ [hereinafter ACOs: General
Information].
9
See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Affordable Care Act and the Medicare Program: The Engines of True Health Reform, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., &
ETHICS 253, 295 (2013) (“Although the provider community was initially skeptical of ACOs, . . . they have responded to the initiative relatively enthusiastically.”) (footnote omitted).
10
See Berwick, supra note 3, at 4 (“CMS believes that with enhanced cooperation among beneficiaries, hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers, ACOs will be an important new tool for giving Medicare beneficiaries the
affordable, high-quality care they want, need, and deserve.”); Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14,
2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/ (“While
ACOs are touted as a way to help fix an inefficient payment system that rewards
more, not better, care, some economists warn they could lead to greater consolidation in the health care industry . . . .”); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (“The ACO strategy entails regulatory interventions that at
once aim to reshape the health care delivery system, improve outcomes, promote
adoption of evidence-based medicine and supportive technology, and create a
platform for controlling costs under payment system reform.”). While multiple
ACO models exist, this Comment will refer to them collectively as the “ACO
model of care.”
11
Interestingly, the ACO model of care did not originate from the ACA. See
Paul R. DeMuro, Accountable Care, 24 HEALTH L. 1, 11 (2012) (“ACOs are not
uniquely a convention of the Medicare program and have existed in some form
for a number of years. In fact, many provider/health plan ‘partnerships’ are in the
form of . . . [commercial] ACOs.”).
12
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6.
13
Leflar, supra note 4, at 49.

2016]

A PROMISE REALIZED?

317

model of care.14 This Comment advocates for a rebalancing of priorities to achieve the original tri-mission of expanded access, improved quality, and reduced costs within the new, post-ACA American health care system.
Part I begins with an overview of the statutory definition, philosophy and values, and various organizational structures currently
in place for ACOs. Following this foundational description of the
ACO model of care, this Comment will consider three perspectives
in the overall discussion of ACOs, all of which are within the framework of the “Triple Aim.”15 Part II considers the first of these perspectives—reducing overall costs within the American health system—by exploring the idea of “bending the cost curve,” and the general ability of the ACO model to reduce costs under the current Medicare system and beyond. Part III critically reviews the grading
methodology used to achieve the second perspective in the triangle—quality of care provided—and asks whether this methodology
is accurately structured to achieve true improvements in quality of
care. Part IV considers the third perspective of the “Triple Aim”16—
expanding access to care—and evaluates whether ACOs have met
that goal. This Comment concludes with final thoughts on the general success of, as well as the future trajectory, of the ACO model
of care.
I. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: PHILOSOPHY, STATUTE,
AND ORGANIZATION
Though the ACO model of care has become a popularized product of the ACA,17 the concept of the ACO generally existed in one
form or another prior to the passage of the ACA.18 However, because of the passage of the ACA, the ACO model has become one
of the more lucrative, incentive-based programs for health care providers.19 For policymakers, the concept of the ACO fits nicely in the
14

Id.
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6.
16
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6.
17
See, e.g., Gold, supra note 10 (“ACOs have become one of the most talked
about new ideas in . . . [the ACA].”).
18
DeMuro, supra note 11, at 1, 11.
19
Part II provides a detailed discussion of the payment methods used to reward ACOs for savings generated. See generally infra Part II.
15
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shifting framework, goals, and values of the new post-ACA American health care system.20
Defined as “a group of primary care doctors, specialists, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together with a common goal of delivering high-quality coordinated care to their Medicare patients,”21 the ACO model of care aims to balance the “Triple
Aim”22 by implementing a “carrot-and-stick approach” to care.23 Essentially, the ACO model creates a multi-team system of care in
which overall reductions in cost and general improvements in quality care are rewarded.24 At least 744 ACOs have been created since
2011, both privately and through public programs created through
Medicare.25 While strategies of implementation vary among ACOs,
20

Greaney, supra note 10, at 4 (“The MSSP attempts to tackle this policy
quandary [of changing the payment and delivery system of the health care system]
by addressing both problems simultaneously, offering financial rewards to providers that organize and reorient their practices to deliver seamless, high quality
care.”).
21
Robert Tagalicod, Accountable Care Organizations: The Future of Coordinated Care, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:33 PM),
https://www.cms.gov/eHealth/ListServ_AccoutableCareOrgs.html; Kinney, supra note 9, at 294 (“CMS defines ACOs as ‘groups of doctors, hospitals, and other
health care providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high
quality care to their Medicare patients.’”); see also Song, supra note 1, at 364
(“Three key characteristics are embedded in this definition. First is joint accountability. . . . Second, an ACO takes on accountability for both spending and quality. . . . Third, an ACO is responsible for the care of a population of people.”).
22
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6.
23
Gold, supra note 10 (“The law takes a carrot-and-stick approach by encouraging the formation of . . . [ACOs] in the Medicare program. Providers make
more if they keep their patients healthy.”).
24
Berwick, supra note 3, at 1 (“Under the law, an ACO will assume responsibility for the care of a clearly defined population of Medicare beneficiaries attributed to it on the basis of their patterns of use of primary care. If an ACO succeeds in both delivering high-quality care and reducing the cost of that care to a
level below what would otherwise have been expected, it will share in the Medicare savings it achieves.”); Song, supra note 1, at 368 (“ACOs serve as a vehicle
for payment reform and organizational reform among providers. They bring physicians across specialties and hospitals together under the same contractual roof,
allowing the organization to determine how it allocates its resources under the
spending target.”).
25
Gold, supra note 10 (“About 6 million Medicare beneficiaries are now in
an ACO, and, combined with the private sector, at least 744 organizations have
become ACOs since 2011. An estimated 23.5 million Americans are now being
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the ACA provides a general statutory framework to guide the formation, goals, values, and organizational functioning of ACOs in
the United States.26
A. Statutory Definition of ACOs Under the Affordable Care
Act
Buried in the long list of reforms and policy strategies within the
ACA, Title III27—titled “Improving the Quality and Efficiency of
Health Care”—is the formulaic attempt to balance the “Triple Aim”
for beneficiaries participating in the Medicare program.28 This title
aims to 1) improve quality of care and 2) more efficiently deliver
care by reforming the payment structures, quality standards, delivery methods, and organizational models through which Medicare
beneficiaries receive care.29 Of the seven subtitles under Title III,
subtitle A forms the statutory basis for generally achieving the “Triple Aim”: Part I influences the current cost structures; Part II addresses the quality of care provided; and Part III targets the efficiency of care.30 Specifically, Part III outlines in detail the ACO
model of care through the Medicare Shared Savings Program.31

served by an ACO.”); Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the
ACA: A Need for Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?,
12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 103, 162 (2015) (“[T]he ACA does not prohibit the development of ‘private’ ACOs, which are free to organize and operate independent
of the Medicare Program. In theory, at least for now, such ACOs could operate
entirely as for-profit enterprises relying solely on reimbursement from non-governmental, third-party payors . . . .”). See generally Valerie A. Lewis et al., Accountable Care Organizations in the United States: Market and Demographic
Factors Associated with Formation, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1840, 1849–53
(2013) (providing visual and descriptive results of the number of ACOs across
various geographical regions); David Muhlestein, Growth And Dispersion Of Accountable Care Organizations In 2015, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015), http:
//healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-and-dispersion-of-accountable-careorganizations-in-2015-2/ (Section titled “ACO Growth,” which describes the increase in the number of ACOs since 2011 when ACO contracts began).
26
See infra Part I, section A, subsection 3; Part. I, section C.
27
PPACA, tit. III, 124 Stat. at 353–538.
28
See generally id.
29
See id.
30
PPACA, tit. III, subtit. A, pt. I–III, 124 Stat. at 353–415.
31
Id. at pt. III, 124 Stat. at 389–415.

320

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:312

1. SUBTITLE A, PART III: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW PATIENT CARE MODELS
Subtitle A, Part III32 is “designed to make the delivery of, and
payment for, health care services to Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries more integrated and efficient and therefore, less costly.”33
This part of Subtitle A establishes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (“CMI”) within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), as well as several incentive programs for
health care providers of varying size and experience to participate
in the twin goals of Title III: improving quality and efficiency. 34 In
effect, Part III creates a national laboratory for creating, testing, and
refining models of care consistent with the “Triple Aim.”35
2. SECTION 3021: ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTER FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID INNOVATION WITHIN CENTER FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES
Section 3021 outlines the mission and objectives of the CMI, the
research arm used to identify and test models that best reduce the
cost of care while improving quality.36 The CMI “test[s] innovative
payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of care furnished
to individuals.”37 Based on the research results produced from “consult[ing] representatives of relevant Federal agencies, and clinical
and analytical experts with expertise in medicine and health care
management,”38 the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) will “give preference to models that . . .

32

PPACA, tit. III, subtit. A, pt. III, secs. 3021–27, 124 Stat. at 389–415.
Kinney, supra note 9, at 292.
34
See PPACA, tit. III, subtit. A, pt. III, sec. 3021, 124 Stat. at 389–95.
35
See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Innovation Center, CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov (last visited Jan. 29,
2016).
36
42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012); David Blumenthal et al., The Affordable Care
Act at 5 Years, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2451, 2455 (2015) (“Funded at $1 billion
per year for 10 years, CMMI has the authority to undertake a wide variety of experiments for the purpose of improving quality and reducing cost within the Medicare and Medicaid Programs.”).
37
42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1).
38
Id. at (a)(3).
33
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improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services furnished to applicable individuals.”39 The Secretary selects
models based on “evidence that the model addresses a defined population for which there are deficits in care leading to poor clinical
outcomes or potentially avoidable expenditures.”40 Successful models may be expanded on a national scale in order to further the twin
goals of improving quality and efficiency of care.41
3. SECTION 3022: MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM
As a separate initiative, Section 3022 creates the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”), the program through which the
ACO initiative exists.42 The MSSP aims to “promote[] accountability for a patient population and coordinate[] items and services . . . ,
and encourages investment in infrastructure and redesigned care
processes for high quality and efficient service delivery.”43 To do
so, the MSSP sets a broad model of participation such that:
(A) groups of providers of services and suppliers
meeting criteria specified by the Secretary may work
together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare
fee-for-service beneficiaries through an accountable
care organization . . . ; and
(B) ACOs that meet quality performance standards
established by the Secretary are eligible to receive
payments for shared savings . . . .44
Under this provision, groups of health care providers who meet
the eligibility requirements may receive payment for shared savings
earned for meeting defined performance standards by coordinating
39

Id. at (a)(1).
Id. at (b)(2)(A).
41
Blumenthal et al., supra note 36, at 2455 (“This new capability to spread
proven programs quickly could markedly enhance the nimbleness of federal policymaking.”).
42
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
43
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1).
44
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A)–(B); Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations in the Affordable Care Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1371, 1372
(2012) (“The MSSP is an incentive program, not a mandate: the private sector
must choose to participate if it is to be effective.”).
40

322

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:312

the overall care of Medicare beneficiaries assigned to the ACO by
the Secretary.45 Eligibility is determined based on whether the group
of providers “have established a mechanism for shared governance,”46 though Section 3022 does not require any particular structure of governance.47
However, all participating ACOs must meet the following eight
general requirements that help define and guide the operation of an
ACO: 1) a willingness “to become accountable for the quality, cost,
and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned” to the ACO; 2) a formal contract of no less than three years
entered with the Secretary; 3) a formal legal structure that allows
“the organization to receive and distribute payments for shared savings”; 4) a minimum number of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries that the ACO serves (at least 5,000), as well as primary care physicians; 5) the provision of necessary information to the Secretary to
aid in the assigning of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, as
well as “the implementation of quality and other reporting requirements”; 6) a leadership and management structure “that includes
clinical and administrative systems”; 7) a process “to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and

45
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A)–(B); id. at (c) (“The Secretary shall determine an appropriate method to assign Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries to
an ACO based on their utilization of primary care services provided . . . by an
ACO professional.”).
46
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(1)(A)–(E); Louise Walling, Joining an ACO? Questions to ask before you sign, 4 TEX. MED. LIABILITY TR. 1, 2 (2013).
47
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Shared Savings Program,
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 20, 2015, 11:50 AM), https://www.
cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/in
dex.html?redirect=/sharedsavingsprogram/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Shared Savings Program] (“Participation in an ACO is purely voluntary.”);
Corbett, supra note 25, at 160 (“By design, the ACA has not specified any particular legal or organizational form through which these multiple stakeholders are to
accomplish the requisite ‘shared governance’ of the ACO.”). Section 3022 does
articulate a select group of providers that will be eligible to participate; however,
it also includes a catch-all provision that states that “[s]uch other groups of providers of services and suppliers as the Secretary determines appropriate” may participate, leaving the “shared governance” structure broad. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395jjj(b)(1)(A)–(E).
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cost measures, and coordinate care”; and 8) an ability to “demonstrate to the Secretary that . . . [the ACO] meets patient-centeredness
criteria specified by the Secretary.”48
These general requirements are coupled with quality and reporting requirements, established to determine the overall reduction of
costs and improvement in quality and efficiency of care that an ACO
provides in a given year.49 These quality and reporting requirements
are established by the Secretary in conjunction with quality performance standards designed “to assess the quality of care furnished
by . . . ACO[s],”50 with quality standards improving over time “by
specifying higher standards, new measures, or both . . . .”51 This information is collected by the ACO during a given year and then submitted to the Secretary in order “to evaluate the quality of care furnished by the ACO.”52 The information collected can range from
“clinical processes and outcomes” to “patient and . . . caregiver experience of care,” as well as “utilization.”53
In exchange for meeting these quality and cost-saving requirements, participating ACOs are eligible to receive a payment of
“shared savings.”54 Such “shared savings” are calculated as “a percent . . . of the difference between . . . [the] estimated average per
48

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A)–(H); Corbett, supra note 25, at 160
n.296; The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinical Practice, What is an
ACO, DARTMOUTH INST. HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRAC., http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/research/evaluating/health-system-focus/accountable-care-organizations/about-us (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Dartmouth Institute] (Articulating that all ACOs must be capable of: 1) “Providing or managing the continuum of care for patients as a real or virtually integrated delivery system”; 2)
“Supporting comprehensive performance measurement and expenditure projections”; 3) “Internally distributing shared savings and prospectively planning
budgets and resource needs.”); DeMuro, supra note 11, at 3–5 (listing the foundational elements of an accountable care organization, including: “Patient-Centered Medical Homes”; “Cross-Collaborative Team Approach to Care”; “Strong
Foundation of High-Performing Primary Care”; “Ability to Measure Quality”;
“Evidence-Based Medicine”; “Transparency”; “Health Information Technology”;
“Culture of Accountability”; “Integrating Independent Physicians”; and “Telemedicine and E-Health.”).
49
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(3)(A)–(D).
50
Id. at (b)(3)(A).
51
Id. at (b)(3)(C).
52
Id. at (b)(3)(B).
53
See id. at (b)(3)(A)(i)–(iii).
54
Id. at (d)(1)(A).
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capita Medicare expenditures in a year”55 and a benchmark set by
the Secretary,56 with limits to the total amount of shared savings an
ACO is able to receive.57 This benchmark is set “using the most recent available [three] years of per-beneficiary expenditures for . . .
services for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the
ACO” and is adjusted both annually and to the characteristics of
each beneficiary.58 A provider or supplier’s original payments under
the Medicare fee-for-service program remain unaltered;59 rather, the
shared savings incentive is an additional payment that may be
earned by participating ACOs that meet the quality performance
standards and general ACO requirements.60 However, the Secretary
maintains the discretion to terminate contracts with ACOs that do
not meet the quality performance standards,61 as well as impose
sanctions on ACOs that attempt to reduce costs by avoiding at-risk
patients.62
Alternatively, the Secretary may choose to use a payment model
other than the shared savings model for making payments to participating ACOs.63 The first of these alternatives is a partial capitation
model in which the participating ACO “is at financial risk for some,
but not all, of the items and services covered.”64 This payment model
is typically limited to advanced health systems best able to bear the
risk.65 The second alternative allows for the Secretary to implement
a payment model “that the Secretary determines will improve the
quality and efficiency of items and services furnished” by the participating ACO.66 In both these alternatives, the payment model

55

Id. at (d)(2).
Id. at (d)(1)(B)(ii).
57
Id. at (d)(2).
58
Id. at (d)(1)(B)(ii).
59
Id. at (d)(1)(A) (original payments by Medicare are “made to providers of
services and suppliers participating in an ACO, under the original Medicare feefor-service program.”).
60
Id.
61
Id. at (d)(4).
62
Id. at (d)(3).
63
Id. at (i)(1).
64
Id. at (i)(2)(A).
65
Id. at (i)(2)(A) (this payment model is limited to “ACOs that are highly
integrated systems of care and . . . [are] capable of bearing risk.”).
66
Id. at (i)(3)(A).
56
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must not be designed to cause more spending towards the participating ACO than would have been spent for the ACO under a normal
payment model.67
B. Philosophy and Vision for ACOs
The ACA and the rapid move to the ACO model of care reflects
a national desire to increase health coverage for all Americans while
reducing the cost of care in the United States.68 These national aims
are encapsulated in the “Triple Aim”69—increasing access to care,
reducing cost of care, and improving quality of care70—which mirror the goal of the ACO model of care71—“to be accountable for the
overall cost and quality for a full spectrum of care for a defined population.”72 ACOs are driven by three philosophical principles that
align with the “Triple Aim”: 1) “Local Accountability” by assigning
the patient to the ACO where they receive the greatest number of
services, but without requiring the patient to only go to the assigned
ACO; 2) “Shared Savings” that ACOs may earn when quality stand-

67

Id. at (i)(2)(B), (i)(3)(B).
Leflar, supra note 4, at 49.
69
IHI Triple Aim, supra note 6.
70
Berwick, supra note 3, at 1; Leflar, supra note 4, at 49 (quotations removed).
71
Ellen Josephine Angelo, Accountable care organizations: Are they the
right answer?, 42 NURSING MGMT. 20, 22 (2011) (“The goal of the ACO is to pay
providers . . . utilizing a methodology that encourages the team to collaboratively
work together and share accountability based on efficiency and high quality exceeding national benchmarks.”).
72
Dartmouth Institute, supra note 48. See also Angelo, supra note 71; Berwick, supra note 3, at 1; Greaney, supra note 10, at 5–6 (“[T]he core concept [of
an ACO] envisions a local entity and a related set of providers, including primary
care physicians, specialists, and hospitals that can be held accountable for the cost
and quality of the entire continuum of care delivered to a defined population . . . .”); Peter Wehrwein, An Accounting of ACOs: Where they are, what they
are, and how many there are, MANAGED CARE MAG. ONLINE (Nov. 2014), http://
www.managedcaremag.com/linkout/2014/11/26 (defining ACOs as “a providerled organization that takes on the financial risk for the health care of a defined
population.”).
68
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ards are met and costs are reduced; and 3) “Performance Measurement[s]” which ACOs must collect to monitor overall performance.73
An ACO “itself has a fiduciary obligation to the patients it serves
comparable to that historically attributed only to physicians,” extending this “well-established [duty] in the profession of medicine
‘to all major participants in the health care industry’ . . . involved in
the direct delivery of health care services to patients.”74 This standard in turn shifts the control element from insurers to providers of
care because beneficiaries are assigned to ACOs based on usage rather than on plan selection.75 Along with this fiduciary obligation,
ACOs are held to a level of accountability through the measures and
quality reporting requirements, as well as the requirement to control
costs.76 Similarly, the ACO model of care is intended to shift the
payment model from one of fee-for-service to one based on delivering the highest quality care at the lowest price possible.77 By setting
a fiduciary obligation and an accountability measure on participating ACOs, along with a restructured payment model, the intention
is for the ACO to fix the fragmented American health system that
currently lacks coordination and communication.78

73

Dartmouth Institute, supra note 48. See also Pasquale, supra note 44, at
1374 (Describing “the ‘three key attributes’ of ACOS [as]: ‘organized care, performance measurement, and payment reform.’”).
74
Corbett, supra note 25, at 177.
75
Greaney, supra note 10, at 7–8 (Noting the distinction between Health
Management Organizations (“HMOs”) and ACOs, including that beneficiaries
are assigned to a specific ACO whereas beneficiaries are not assigned to HMOs).
76
DeMuro, supra note 11, at 1 (the ACO “understand[s] that care will be
measured and reported and that quality must improve, all while costs are controlled, or at least monitored.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Michealle Gady & Marc Steinberg, Making the Most of Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs): What Advocates Need to Know, FAMILIES USA 1, 2 (February 2012), http://familiesusa.org/sites/default/files/product_documents/ACOBasics.pdf (“One of the goals of ACOs is to move the health care system away
from a fee-for-service system, in which providers are paid for each service a patient receives, to one focused on delivering the best care at the best price.”). This
is discussed in further detail in Part III. See infra Part III, section A.
78
Gady & Steinberg, supra note 77, at 2 (“ACOs aim to fix the fragmentation
in our health care system by addressing simultaneously both the way care is delivered . . . and the way that it is paid for . . . .The ACO should help bridge the gap
in communication that has often existed between providers . . . [and] health care
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C. Organizational Structures of ACOs
While several models of ACOs have been promulgated and
tested since the passage of the ACA,79 three major models have
arisen through CMS. They vary based on their contractual structure,
organizational development, and payment method.80 These three
major models include the Medicare Shared Savings Program, the
Pioneer ACO Model, and the Advanced Payment ACO Model.
1. MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM
Of the major ACO models created and tested, MSSP is currently
one of the largest initiatives serving fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries.81 Under this “new approach to the delivery of health
care,”82 participating organizations must meet quality performance
standards set forth by the Secretary while generating savings in order to qualify for the percentage of the “shared savings” from the
Medicare program.83 Shared savings are determined by calculating
the difference between the dollar amount spent per patient in a given

providers.”); Gold, supra note 10 (“ACOs are touted as a way to help fix an inefficient payment system that rewards more, not better, care . . . .”); Greaney, supra
note 10, at 1 (“The ACO strategy entails regulatory interventions that at once aim
to reshape the health care delivery system, improve outcomes, promote adoption
of evidence-based medicine and supportive technology, and create a platform for
controlling costs under payment system reform.”). See Berwick, supra note 3, at
1 (“A common criticism of U.S. health care is the fragmented nature of its payment and delivery systems [in which] . . . no single group of participants . . . takes
full responsibility for guiding the health of a patient or community . . . .Fragmentation leads to waste and duplication—and unnecessarily high costs.”).
79
See ACOs: General Information, supra note 8 (“ACO Programs at CMS”).
80
See id.
81
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Accountable Care Organizations and Public Health, ASS’N ST. & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS 1,
2 (2013), http://www.astho.org/programs/access/primary-care/_materials/acoand-public-health-fact-sheet/ [hereinafter ASTHO] (“One of the largest ACO initiatives . . . [a]s of September 2012, MSSP selected 116 organizations . . . to participate in the program.”). See Shared Savings Program, supra note 47.
82
Shared Savings Program, supra note 47.
83
ASTHO, supra note 81, at 2; Shared Savings Program, supra note 47
(“[T]he Shared Savings Program aims to improve [Medicare fee-for-service] beneficiary outcomes and increase value of care . . . [by] reward[ing] ACOs that
lower their growth in health care costs while meeting performance standards on
quality of care and putting patients first.”).
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year and the national benchmark set by the government, which represents the amount of health care dollars allocated per patient per
year.84 If the amount calculated is less than the national benchmark,
the ACO experiences a “shared savings,” of which the Medicare
program will pay back a percentage to the participating ACO.85
However, ACOs in the MSSP do not face shared risk for exceeding
the national benchmark due to the contractual relationship created—
the so called “one-sided ACO contract.”86 Reducing the cost of care
alone is insufficient; rather, the quality of care the ACO coordinates
and provides must improve, based on thirty-three quality measures
across four domains.87 As the quality of care improves and the health
84

Walling, supra note 46, at 1–2. This national benchmark that the ACO assumes as its spending target “usually takes into account its historical cost trends
and the burden of morbidity among its patients.” Song, supra note 1, at 364.
85
Walling, supra note 46, at 2; Song, supra note 1, at 364–65. (manuscript at
2) (“If spending for [the ACO’s]. . . patient population ends up below the target
by at least a minimum amount, the organization receives a share of the savings. If
the spending exceeds the target. . . the organization may not be reimbursed a portion of the difference.”). The percentage earnable under a one-sided contract is 50
percent of the savings generated. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Guide to Quality Performance Scoring Methods for Accountable Care Organizations, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 4 (2012), https://www.cms.gov/
medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/sharedsavingsprogram/downloads/2
012-11-aco-quality-scoring-supplement.pdf [hereinafter Guide to Quality Performance].
86
Song, supra note 1, at 365 (“In a so-called one-sided ACO contract—the
majority of those in the . . . [MSSP]—organizations face only shared savings but
do not face shared risk.”); McClellan et al., A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 984 (2010) (“[A] ‘one-sided’
shared-savings model . . . would entail no performance risk to providers even if
they experience higher costs or if they do not achieve quality performance
goals.”).
87
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, The Affordable Care Act:
Helping Providers Help Patients, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 2,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/downl
oads/ACO-Menu-Of-Options.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter A Menu
of Options] (“These [four] domains include patient, experience, care coordination
and patient safety, preventive health[,] and at-risk populations.”). See generally
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Quality Measures and Performance
Standards, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.
cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Q
uality_Measures_Standards.html (providing information and resources on the
thirty-three current quality measures). Quality measures and domains are discussed in detail in Part III. See infra Part III, section A.
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expenditures decrease, the ACO will experience a greater amount of
shared savings.88
2. PIONEER ACO MODEL
The second of the ACO models is a more advanced model “designed for health care organizations and providers that are already
experienced in coordinating care for patients across care settings.”89
Unlike other ACO initiatives, Pioneer ACOs allow “provider groups
to move more rapidly from a shared savings payment model to a
population-based payment model . . . [that is] flexible to accommodate [to] the specific organizational and market conditions in which
[the] Pioneer ACOs work.”90 Similar to other ACO models, Pioneer
ACOs work to improve quality of care and health outcomes provided to Medicare beneficiaries, while reducing the cost of care for
all paying actors.91 Unlike the MSSP ACOs, Pioneer ACOs enter a
“two-sided contract” in which the participating ACO faces “both

88

A Menu of Options, supra note 87, at 2 (“The higher the quality of care
providers deliver, the more shared savings their Accountable Care Organization
may earn, provided they also lower growth in health care expenditures.”).
89
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 07, 2015), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/index.html [hereinafter Pioneer ACO Model] (last
visited Sept. 26, 2016); ASTHO, supra note 81, at 2 (“The Pioneer Model was
designed for organizations with previous experience operating in ACO-like arrangements with coordinated, patient-centered care.”); A Menu of Options, supra
note 87, at 2 (“The Pioneer model is an initiative complementary to the
[MSSP] . . . designed for organizations with experience providing integrated care
across settings.”); Kinney, supra note 9, at 294 (“The Pioneer ACO Model was
designed specifically for organizations with ‘experience offering coordinated, patient-centered care, and operating in ACO-like arrangements.’”).
90
Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89; A Menu of Options, supra note 87, at
2 (“The Pioneer Model tests a rapid transition to a population-based model of care,
and engages other payers in moving toward outcomes-based contracts.”); ASTHO,
supra note 81, at 2 (The Pioneer ACO Model “will allow these provider groups
to move more rapidly from a shared savings payment model to a population-based
payment model.”).
91
Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (The Pioneer ACO Model aligns “provider incentives, which will improve quality and health outcomes for patients
across the ACO, and achieve cost savings for Medicare, employers[,] and patients.”).

330

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:312

shared savings and shared risk,” but enjoys potentially higher returns for meeting quality measures and cost reductions.92 Savings
received or losses owed in a given year are based on whether the
ACO’s expenditures are “outside a minimum corridor set by the
ACO’s minimum savings rate (MSR) and minimum loss rate
(MLR).”93 While the program began with thirty-two Pioneer
ACOs,94 the program currently has nine participating ACOs.95
3. ADVANCED PAYMENT ACO MODEL
The Advanced Payment ACO Model arose out of stakeholder
concerns regarding their lack of available capital to invest in infrastructure and staff needed to provide the high-quality care demanded
of participating ACOs.96 Under the Advanced Payment ACO
Model, participating ACOs—typically smaller ACOs formed by
physician-owned and rural providers97—receive an upfront,
92
McClellan et al., supra note 86, at 984 (“Also possible are ‘two-sided’ or
‘symmetric’ payment models that would give providers an opportunity to receive
proportionately larger bonus payments in exchange for accountability for costs
that greatly exceed preset goals.”); Song, supra note 1, at 365.The percentage
earnable under a two-sided contract is sixty percent of the savings generated. See
Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 4.
93
Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (“If savings/loss is within this corridor,
no payment is made to the ACO or owed to CMS. If the Gross Savings/Losses
percentage is outside this corridor, then the ACO splits the overall savings/loss
with CMS.”).
94
ASTHO, supra note 81, at 2 (As of 2013, “[t]hirty-two ACOs [were] . . .
participating in the Pioneer ACO Model.”); Kinney, supra note 9, at 294 (As of
2013, “[t]here [were] thirty-two organizations participating in the Pioneer ACO
Model.”).
95
See Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89. This decrease in the number of
participating ACOs is likely due to the high standards required to share in savings
generated. See, e.g., Peter Wehrwein, Pioneer ACOs: Some Unhitch Wagons
While Others Roll Over Rocky Terrain, MANAGED CARE MAG. ONLINE (Oct.
2014), http://www.managedcaremag.com/linkout/2014/10/43. See also infra Part
II, section A, subsection 1; note 138, 151–52.
96
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Advance Payment ACO Model,
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://innovation.cms.
gov/initiatives/Advance-Payment-ACO-Model/index.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2016) [hereinafter Advance Payment ACO Model] (“In developing the Advance
Payment ACO Model, CMS is responding to input from stakeholders . . . [who]
expressed a concern about their lack of ready access to the capital needed to invest
in infrastructure and staff for care coordination.”).
97
Kinney, supra note 9, at 294.
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monthly payment in “advance [of] the shared savings they are expected to earn” to support start-up costs and infrastructure-building.98 In return, CMS recovers the advance payments through the
shared savings experienced by the ACO.99 ACOs participating in
this model of care receive three types of payments, which
“acknowledge that new ACOs will have both fixed and variable
start-up costs”100: 1) an upfront, fixed payment received by each
ACO; 2) an upfront, variable payment that is based on the number
of historically-assigned beneficiaries to the ACO; and 3) a monthly
payment that varies based on the size of the ACO and the number of
historically-assigned beneficiaries to the ACO.101 Through this payment structure, the Advanced Payment ACO Model allows “physician-based and rural providers [participating in MSSP] . . . [to]
come together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to
the Medicare patients they serve.”102 There are currently thirty-five
participants under this ACO model.103
II. PERSPECTIVE #1: “BENDING THE COST CURVE” THROUGH ACOS
The first perspective considers whether the ACO model are able
to truly have a cost-cutting impact on the general rise in health care
costs experienced in America over the past several decades. As a
98
Advance Payment ACO Model, supra note 96 (“Through the Advance Payment ACO Model, selected participants will receive upfront and monthly payments, which they can use to make important investments in their care coordination infrastructure . . . .[S]elected organizations will receive an advance on the
shared savings they are expected to earn.”); Kinney, supra note 9, at 294 (“The
Advanced Payment ACO Model provides additional support to physician-owned
and rural providers who would benefit from additional start-up resources to build
the necessary infrastructure, such as new staff or information technology systems.”).
99
A Menu of Options, supra note 87, at 2 (“The advance payments would be
recovered from shared savings achieved by the Accountable Care Organization.”).
100
Advance Payment ACO Model, supra note 96 (“Advance payments are
structured . . . to acknowledge that new ACOs will have both fixed and variable
start-up costs.”).
101
Advance Payment ACO Model, supra note 96 (“Initiative Details”).
102
Advance Payment ACO Model, supra note 96. See ASTHO, supra note 81,
at 2 (“The Advance Payment ACO Model will provide additional support to physician-owned and rural providers participating in the Shared Savings Program . . . .”).
103
Advance Payment ACO Model, supra note 96.
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cost-generating enterprise, “ACOs can be seen as an attempt to mitigate market and regulatory failures that pervade the financing and
delivery of health care services.”104 This section will consider
whether, in reality, ACOs are able to have such a pervasive effect
on the overall costs of health care in the United States, or whether
this model of care can only have a small effect on spending. Once
“bending the cost curve” is defined, the cost-cutting effects of ACOs
will be considered, ending with a survey of suggested approaches to
further reduce costs through the ACO model of care.
A. What Does It Mean to “Bend the Cost Curve?”
Understanding the theory of “bending the cost curve” in the context of the ACO begins with a consideration of the overall growth in
spending within the American health care system since the creation
of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the late 1960s. Immediately following its passage, the Medicare program began allocating
millions of federal dollars into the American health care system, resulting in the health care system’s rapid growth as a sizeable portion
of the national gross domestic product (“GDP”).105 Since 1960,
“health spending [in the United States] has grown nearly five times
as much as GDP . . . [yet the United States does] not achieve longer
life or overall better health statistics than other industrialized countries with modern health care systems.”106 However, this increase in

104

Greaney, supra note 10, at 4.
Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing*
Our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J. 822, 823 (2013) (“Medicare was implemented in 1966; as a result, the federal government immediately began to pour
millions of federal dollars into health care expenditures, which have rapidly
grown to ever-higher percentages of our gross domestic product . . . .”). See also
John Lechleiter, To Bend The Cost Curve Downward, Stop Focusing On Minor
Cost Cuts, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnlechleiter/2014/08/15/to-bend-the-healthcare-cost-curve-downward-stop-focusing-on-minor-cost-cuts/print/ (“Health spending is by far the biggest single
factor driving growth in the federal budget—fueled, in large part, by the aging of
the Baby Boom generation, as 10,000 Americans turn 65 every day for another
16 years.”).
106
Furrow, supra note 105, at 823 (“Yet for all this spending, we do not
achieve longer life or overall better health statistics than other industrialized countries with modern health care systems.”).
105
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spending has decreased slightly since the 2008 recession,107 creating
uncertainty as to the underlying cause of this reduction.108
The concept of “bending the cost curve” developed against this
backdrop, focusing policymakers’ and academics’ analysis around
the question: “Does this health reform proposal bend the cost
curve?”109 This question simply translates into whether a proposed
107

Furrow, supra note 105, at 824 (“The recession of 2008 has reduced this
differential [between health care costs and general inflation]; health spending and
GDP grew at similar rates in 2010, with health spending as a share of GDP steady
at 17.9%. National health expenditures growth has ranged from as high as 11.0%
in 1990 to 3.9% in 2010.”). See also Sophie Novack, The Health Cost Curve Is
Bending. Is Obamacare to Blame?, NAT’L J. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.national
journal.com/health-care/2014/01/02/health-cost-curve-is-bending-is-obamacareblame (“Federal actuaries estimate that real spending on health care increased
only 0.8 percent per person in 2012, slightly less than real gross domestic product
per capita. Comparatively, since 1960, spending has increased an average of 2.3
percentage points more than GDP growth.”); Ezra Klein, The cost curve is bending. Does Obamacare deserve the credit?, THE WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May
31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/31/thecost-curve-is-bending-does-obamacare-deserve-the-credit/ (“National health
spending grew by 3.9 percent each year from 2009 to 2011, the lowest rate of
growth since the federal government began keeping such statistics in 1960 . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Charles Roehrig, What Is Behind The Post-Recession Bend In The Health Care Cost Curve?, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/23/what-is-behindthe-post-recession-bend-in-the-health-care-cost-curve/print/ (Exhibit 2 titled
“Shares Of NHE [National Health Expenditures]: Middle Of Post-Recession Period (2011)” exhibiting the break down in health care spending for 2011).
108
See Furrow, supra note 105, at 824 (“Slowing in health care spending may
be due to several factors.”); Klein, supra note 107 (“The curve is bending, but we
don’t really know why, and we don’t know if it’ll stay bent.”); Novack, supra note
107 (“The recent slowdown is promising, but analysts remain split over what accounts for the change—and, consequently, how long it will be sustained. The
more pessimistic view is that the lower cost growth is a result of the recession and
will inflate again as the economy recovers. The optimistic explanation is that
measures to control costs might finally be working—including related provisions
in the Affordable Care Act.”); Roehrig, supra note 107 (“I now turn to . . . the
record low growth in NHE that began in 2009 . . . and continued through
2013 . . . .There has been extensive discussion about whether these low rates are
the result of temporary cyclical factors, such as the recession, or more permanent
structural factors.”).
109
Chris Frates, CBO: Bend the cost curve, what does that even mean?,
POLITICO.COM: LIVE PULSE (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.politico.com/livepulse/
1009/CBO_Bend_the_cost_curve_what_does_that_even_mean.html (“It’s a
question that is endlessly asked in Washington, ‘Does this health reform proposal
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health reform will lower health care costs over time.110 While this
has become a catch-phrase to describe what politicians and policymakers hope the reforms under the ACA—such as the ACO model
of care—will do, some find it difficult to project whether a proposed
reform will actually “bend” health care costs.111 Regardless of the
measurability of the “bend” of the cost curve, the success of reforms
like the ACO model of care are critically necessary—their success
could dictate whether “coverage will be affordable and the federal
budget will be close to balanced” or whether “it will be very difficult
for the federal government . . . to keep the spending commitments
made in the health reform act.”112
1. RE-VALUING VALUE-BASED PAYMENTS TO “BEND THE COST
CURVE”
“Bending the cost curve” has become synonymous with restraining costs under the “Triple Aim” and is a major metric in the debate
over the effectiveness of ACOs in containing health care costs. The
key strategy to accomplishing this “bend”—which drives the mission of ACOs—is the transition from a fee-for-service payment system to a value-based payment system.113 Under the fee-for-service
bend the cost curve?’ Really, it’s just a highfalutin way of asking, ‘Does this lower
costs over time?’”); Timothy C. Gutwald, Bending the Health Care Cost Curve:
Incentivizing Quality and Efficiency, 90 MICH. B.J. 20, 20 (2011) (“If health care
spending trends continued, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that by
2025, one quarter of our gross domestic product would be devoted to health care.
Armed with this data, politicians and policymakers began to talk about ‘bending
the cost curve.’”).
110
Frates, supra note 109.
111
Id. (quoting Doug Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget Office
as he expounded on how “it’s hard to know whether a proposal . . . will continue
[to lower costs] . . . indefinitely or, to put it another way, that the curve will stay
bent.”). Elmendorf concludes that a more productive analysis is considering
“whether proposals would ‘lower’ or ‘raise’ the curve . . . than to discuss those
proposals’ effects on the shape of the curve.” See id.
112
David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend The Cost Curve, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1131, 1131 (2010) (“[W]hether reform is successful over the long
haul will be determined almost exclusively by its impact on health care spending
beyond the first decade.”).
113
Corbett, supra note 25, at 149 (“Various provisions . . . [of the ACA] are
designed to ‘shift the payment system from traditional fee-for-service (FFS) to
budgeted . . . or value-based (e.g., pay-for-performance) payment models.”). See
also Furrow, supra note 105, at 861 (“As U.S. healthcare begins to move from an
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payment system, physicians and health care providers are paid for
the quantity of services provided rather than for the quality of the
services provided.114 The incentives from a fee-for-service payment
system are straight forward: “[T]he present [fee-for-service] system
encourages health care providers to offer more and more costly
treatments, not just those that are effective or cost-effective.”115 This
“do more to make more”116 payment system results in inefficient,
ineffective, and unsafe treatment procedures, tests, and diagnoses,
further contributing to the rise in health care spending.117

activity-based business model that incentivizes utilization of services to a valuebased model that incentivizes population health management across the continuum of care, thousands of healthcare ‘science projects’ are taking place in communities nationwide.”); Novack, supra note 107 (“Provider-payment reform focuses on moving away from the current fee-for-service model toward more valuebased rewards, with incentives that encourage efficient and quality care, rather
than quantity.”).
114
Greaney, supra note 10, at 15 (“Since its inception, traditional Medicare
has reimbursed providers using methodologies that reward volume . . . [by paying] on a fee-for-service basis, i.e. issuing a separate payment for each service
provided.”).
115
Gutwald, supra note 109, at 21. See also Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care
Organizations: The Case For Flexible Partnerships Between Health Plans and
Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 32 (2011) (“As is well known, this approach [feefor-service] offers providers powerful financial incentives to increase the volume
of services they deliver.”); Greaney, supra note 10, at 5 (“Most notably, the
longstanding reliance on fee-for-service methods of payment has spawned an
ethos of provider payment that rewards volume and disincentivizes cost-benefit
tradeoffs.”); id. at 15 (“As a result of fee-for-service payment, physicians have
strong incentives to increase the volume of services provided in hospitals . . . .”).
However, “[t]his is not to say that physicians or hospitals try to keep people sick
or knowingly provide unnecessary care . . . .However, the fee-for-service system
offers little motivation to improve quality or efficiency or provide services that
have a low profit margin.” See Gutwald, supra note 109, at 21.
116
Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 35.
117
DeMuro, supra note 11, at 16 (“The unsustainable rate of increase in
healthcare spending in the United States is thought by many to stem from our
historic reliance on fee-for-service as the method of paying for the delivery of
healthcare.”); Furrow, supra note 105, at 829 (“The modes of reimbursement—
fee-for-service payment to physicians and ‘usual, customary, and reasonable’
charges—created a national crisis by 1970.”); Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable
Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1393, 1396 (2012) (“Unfortunately, the health care system as currently organized has limited capacity to reduce waste or improve the management of
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To counter the lucrative fee-for-service payment system, the
ACA shifts the payment method to a value-based purchasing system, also known as “pay-for-performance.”118 This system posits using “outcome measures tied to pay to begin the process of moving
from payment per procedure to true outcome-driven health care.”119
By “linking existing measures of inpatient quality to payment, and
expanding performance-based measurement and payment systems,”
the value-based payment system aims to bring the focus of care on
quality rather than on quantity.120 Because many of the quality
measures used under the volume-based purchasing system are believed to lower health care costs,121 this payment method incentivizes “efficient and quality care, rather than quantity”122 with the intention of “bending the cost curve.” The value-based purchasing
payment method hopes to balance the “Triple Aim” by reducing
costs while increasing quality and efficiency of care.
B. Are ACOs Under Medicare Successfully Bending the Cost
Curve?
At a high level overview of spending in the American health care
system, costs have gone down annually since 2008. Between the
2005–2007 period and the 2009–2013 period, the growth rate in national health spending dropped 2.6 percentage points from 6.5% to
3.9%.123 This is the “lowest rate of growth since the federal government began keeping such statistics in 1960,” and could mean $770
billion in savings for the government if maintained over the next
decade.124
The Medicare program similarly experienced a drop in spending
and experienced a fall in the growth rate in spending on health care

chronic care patients. In particular, incentives inherent in our fee-for-service payment system result in a fragmented delivery system and promote both a higher
volume and intensity of care.”).
118
See supra note 113.
119
Furrow, supra note 105, at 860.
120
See Cutler, supra note 112, at 1134.
121
See id. (“Many of the quality measures being considered are associated
with lower costs—for example, improvements in patient safety.”).
122
See Novack, supra note 107.
123
Roehrig, supra note 107.
124
Klein, supra note 107.
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services (excluding dental services) in comparison to overall spending.125 This reduction occurred while Medicare beneficiary enrollment grew nearly a percentage point faster during the 2009–2013
period than the 2005–2007 period.126 While the reason for these savings remains somewhat unexplained, two major theories have
arisen: 1) These savings are the short-lived effects of the 2008 recession and will likely end as the economy continues to regain momentum, or 2) the effects of the major reforms under the ACA are
working.127
This then begs the question: are ACOs actually contributing to
“bending the cost curve?” The official position of the CMS is “yes,”
and that the “bend” is occurring across the various ACO programs
offered.128 Based on yearly performance results, “Medicare [ACOs]
. . . continue to improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries, while generating financial savings.”129 Quantitatively, this
meant that “the 20 . . . Pioneer ACO Model[s] and [the] 333 . . .
[MSSP] ACOs generated more than $411 million in total savings in
2014”130 while generating over $417 million in savings for Medicare
in 2013.131 Of these savings, 97 of the participating ACOs qualified
125

Roehrig, supra note 107.
Id.
127
See Klein, supra note 107; Novack, supra note 107.
128
See generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare ACOs
continue to succeed in improving care, lowering cost growth, CTRS. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-11-10.html [hereinafter
Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2014]; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Medicare ACOs Provide Improved Care While Slowing Cost Growth in 2014,
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/
Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-0825.html [hereinafter Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2015]. See also, John Okray, Accountable Care Organizations Start to Pay Dividends, 61 FED. LAW. 14 (2014)
(showing the findings reported by CMS in their September 2014 announcement
with regards to participating ACOs).
129
Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2015, supra note 128. See also Medicare ACOs
Fact Sheet 2014, supra note 128 (showing that the financial and quality results
for Performance Year 2 (2013) resulted in similar financial savings and achieving
quality measures).
130
Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2015, supra note 128.
131
Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2014, supra note 128 (“ACOs in the Pioneer
ACO Model and [MSSP] . . . also generated over $417 million in savings for
Medicare.”).
126
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for shared savings payments totaling $422 million.132 Quality standards are consistently being met for the majority of ACOs surveyed.133
While such enormous savings are positive on their face, they
may be somewhat deceiving as they do not reflect the number of
ACOs generating savings in a given year—or, alternatively, not generating savings at all. This may simply be a reflection of savings
generated by some ACOs, rather than a testament to the program as
a whole “bending the cost curve.”134 It would seem that a comprehensive evaluation would consider both the dollar amount saved by
the various ACO programs, as well as the number of ACOs actually
generating savings. Such a holistic analysis can be conducted with
the detailed information collected on the Pioneer ACO Model since
its inception.135 During the three years of reported data on participating Pioneer ACOs, all were able to meet the quality standards set
for that year.136 “However, the first-year experience for many of the
Pioneer ACOs illustrates a disconnect between the quality measures
and cost savings,”137 though this disconnect seems to be lessening
each year.138
132

Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2015, supra note 128 (“At the same time, 97
ACOs qualified for shared savings payments of more than $422 million by meeting quality standards and their savings threshold.”).
133
See Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select
“Performance Year 1 (2012)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 2 (2013)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra
note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 3 (2014)”); Pioneer
ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year
4 (2015)”).
134
See supra note 133.
135
See id.
136
See id.
137
Ken Perez, Emerging Opportunities for ACO Cost Reduction,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 116, 116 (2014). See also supra Table 1.
138
See supra Table 1. One explanation for this seeming “lessening effect” is
that the number of participating Pioneer ACOs has decreased each year since the
first year of the program (2012). See also Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89
(under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 1 (2012)”); Pioneer ACO
Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 2
(2013)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select
“Performance Year 3 (2014)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 4 (2015)”). From this, one may also
make the conjecture that the remaining Pioneer ACOs in the program are the high-
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Table 1 Number and Percentage of Pioneer ACOs Owing
Losses/Receiving $0 in Shared Savings

Year

Number
of Pioneer
ACOs
Owing
Losses

Percentage
of Pioneer
ACOs
Owing
Losses

Year 1
(2012)
Year 2
(2013)
Year 3
(2014)
Year 4
(2015)

1 out
of 32
6 out
of 23
3 out
of 20
1 out
of 12

3.13%
26.09%
15.00%
8.33%

Number
of Pioneer
ACOs Owing
Losses/
Receiving $0
in Shared
Savings

Percentage
of Pioneer
ACOs Owing
Losses/
Receiving $0
in Shared
Savings

19 out
of 32 (+18)
12 out
of 23 (+6)
9 out
of 20 (+6)
6 out
of 12 (+5)

59.38%
52.17%
45.00%
50.00%

Source: Author’s calculation based on data provided at https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/index.html.

Table 1 presents two sets of data relevant to understanding the
number of Pioneer ACOs generating a loss or zero savings for the
Medicare program over the four years of available data.139 The second and third columns reflect the number and percentage, respectively, of participating Pioneer ACOs which incurred a loss—and
subsequently owed money—for Medicare.140 The third and fourth
performing ACOs that were able to meet both the quality standards and the costreducing requirements. Id. While not necessarily a novel revelation, it does beg
the question of whether the Pioneer ACO program is simply “weeding out” the
ineffective participants, leaving a small pool of effective ACOs to dominate the
market in the future. Such an inference would bolster the fear of ACOs monopolizing the health care industry. See infra note 163.
139
See supra Table 1. See also Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under
“Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 1 (2012)”); Pioneer ACO Model,
supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 2 (2013)”);
Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 3 (2014)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative
Details,” select “Performance Year 4 (2015)”). See generally Pioneer ACO
Model, supra note 89.
140
See supra note 139.
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columns reflect the number and percentage, respectively, of participating Pioneer ACOs which either incurred a loss or received no
shared savings but did not owe money to Medicare.141 In essence,
all participating Pioneer ACOs are meeting the quality standards;
however, the same is not true for the savings thresholds set for each
participating ACO.142
Although the intention “is that by meeting the thirty-three quality-performance standards, the needed cost savings will naturally
follow,”143 Table 1 suggests that cost savings do not always follow
simply from meeting the quality standards.144 However, as Table 1
also reflects, the gap between quality standards and cost savings has
progressively decreased each year since the beginning of the program.145 Whether this is due to the fact that fewer ACOs are participating in the Pioneer Model program, or whether it is due to actual
improvements in strategies for cost savings, is beyond the scope of
this Comment. However, such a discrepancy should be clarified in
the CMS analysis and presentation of data as it may be creating a
false perception of success in the Pioneer ACO program.146

141
See id. The reason some Pioneer ACOs owe no money to Medicare but do
not receive a portion of shared savings is due to their contractual relationship with
CMS—the “one-sided contract.” See Part I, section C, subsections 1–2.
142
See supra Table 1. See also Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under
“Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 1 (2012)”); Pioneer ACO Model,
supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 2 (2013)”);
Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 3 (2014)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative
Details,” select “Performance Year 4 (2015)”).
143
Perez, supra note 137, at 116.
144
See supra note 139.
145
See id.
146
See generally Perez, supra note 137, at 116; Pioneer ACO Model, supra
note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 1 (2012)”); Pioneer
ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year
2 (2013)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select
“Performance Year 3 (2014)”); Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 89 (under “Initiative Details,” select “Performance Year 4 (2015)”).; Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet
2015, supra note 128; Medicare ACOs Fact Sheet 2014, supra note 128; Pioneer
ACO Model, supra note 89; supra Table 1.
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C. Can More Be Done to Bend the Cost Curve?
While the ACO model has resulted in general savings since its
inception, some argue that the model focuses on low-impact costsaving measures.147 With such mixed opinions about the success—
or failure—of the ACO model, can more be done to effectively
“bend the cost curve” in a more meaningful way? Several proposals
have been made in the literature,148 which may be beneficial for the
CMI and the CMS to review and possibly incorporate. Though the
list of proposals here is not exhaustive, it presents a snapshot of proposals introduced by both conservative and liberal advocates that
could potentially result in savings to further “bend the cost curve.”
1. IDENTIFYING EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE FINANCIAL
BENCHMARKS
One major set of reforms calls for refining the financial benchmarks ACOs must meet.149 While much of the current literature focuses on reforming the payment method for health services provided,150 it would be beneficial to consider external influences that
may hinder effective cost savings. One measure is to recognize and

See Lechleiter, supra note 105 (arguing that “[i]f we simply take projections of future costs as a given and settle for trimming costs off that trend line, we
will lose opportunities to truly bend the cost curve, and more importantly, to
achieve levels of health and well-being that are unattainable with current technology and financial resources.”).
148
See, e.g., infra notes 150, 162–63, 166, 170.
149
See generally Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing
Health Care Spending, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949 (2012); Hamilton Moses III et
al., The Anatomy of Health Care in the United States, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1947 (2013); Lechleiter, supra note 105; James J. Mongan et al., Options for
Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (2008);
Wehrwein, supra note 95.
150
See, e.g., supra note 149. See also Muhlestein, supra note 25 (“Much of
the policy conversation around accountable care has focused on payment models.
While it is certain that payment models do incent[ivize] behavior, adopting a payment model does not guarantee that a provider will be able to transform the practice of care in a way that improves outcomes and lowers costs . . . . A myopic
policy focus on payment ignores the core objective of accountable care . . . .”).
147
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adjust for regional variations in costs and prices, which have negatively impacted some participating ACOs.151 Such a proposal calls
for the financial benchmarks to take into account the regional variances in the area–wage index, one factor used to calculate Medicare
payments.152
Similarly, it is critical to recognize that the ACO model’s ability
to “bend the cost curve” is limited by the continuing rise in the price
of health care goods and services in the United States.153 Although
the ACO model works to reduce costs for the patient and Medicare,
this model cannot control for the general price of goods and services
used in the provision of care. The reality of health care in the United
States is that some costs can only be controlled when external factors—such as the general price of health care goods and services—
are controlled.154 Recognizing that a portion of costs generated by
See Wehrwein, supra note 95 (Some Pioneer ACOs “stood to get penalized
even though [they] launched . . . management programs, reined in hospital readmissions, and reduced its high rate[s]. The Pioneer financial benchmarks were the
problem . . . .” ). See also Emanuel et al., supra note 149, at 951 (“Prices for the
same services vary substantially within the same geographic area.”).
152
Wehrwein, supra note 95 (“First, the benchmarks haven’t taken into account regional variances in the area-wage index, one of the factors used to calculate Medicare inpatient hospital payment.”). The area-wage index is a standardized amount adjusted “for area differences in hospital wage levels by a factor (established by the Secretary) reflecting the relative hospital wage level in the geographic area of the hospital compared to the national average hospital wage level.”
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Wage Index, CTRS. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Feefor-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/wageindex.html (internal quotation
marks removed).
153
See Moses III et al., supra note 149, at 1949 (“Since 2000, increase in price
has continued but has moderated from historical norms . . . .”). While many have
argued that the greatest impact on spending in the American health care system
has resulted from an ever aging population, along with a higher demand for health
services, data seems to contradict this belief. See id. (“[D]ata contradict[s] [the]
commonly held belief that aging of the population and increased demand for services have driven spending historically.”). See also id. at 1951 (Figure 5 provides
a graphical representation of how medical price growth, while modestly decreasing over time, still remains the greatest portion of health care spending in the
United States).
154
While this may be an unfavorable—or politically unfeasible—recommendation within the American philosophical framework of individualism and capitalism, the data continues to indicate that it is one that must be recognized if effective reforms are to be made. See id. at 1949 (“Between 2000 and 2011, increase
151
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ACOs does not necessarily come from excessive or ineffective care,
but rather from the general price of health goods and services in
America, could help shape meaningful policies that truly “bend the
cost curve” and improve the impact of ACOs on the health care system.155
2. TRANSPARENCY AND PATIENT CHOICE
Another major line of proposals aims to improve transparency
and patient choice within the ACO program. As the price of care
within the American health system continues to consume health
spending,156 one proposal aims to use transparency as a price control
strategy.157 Typically, “consumers almost never receive price information before treatment,”158 leaving them powerless to make informed decisions about their care.159 This results in price variations
within a geographical area and between patients receiving the same
plan of care.160 By requiring health care providers, such as ACOs,
to make “available information about the cost and quality of health

in price (particularly of drugs, medical devices, and hospital care), not intensity
of service or demographic change, produced most of the increase in health’s share
of GDP.”). See also supra note 152.
155
See supra note 153. See also Barry G. Saver et al., Care that Matters:
Quality Measurement and Health Care, 12 PUB. LIBR. MED. 1, 6 (2015) (“[T]here
should be acknowledgement that improved health is often the result of actions by
multiple parties at multiple levels, not individual providers. In many cases, patient
action (or inaction) is critical and individual providers have limited influence.”).
156
See Moses III et al., supra note 149, at 1949.
157
See Emanuel et al., supra note 149, at 951–52. But see Mongan et al., supra
note 149, at 1511–12 (“Although the impact of this approach is unknown, we believe that cost savings are likely to be limited . . . .”). Transparency is defined as
“making available information about the cost and quality of health care services
so that patients can become informed consumers.” See id. at 1511.
158
Emanuel et al., supra note 149, at 951. One reason for this secrecy is because of anticompetitive clauses, such as “gag clauses,” that providers incorporate
in contracts with insurers to “prohibit insurers from releasing price information to
their members.” See id. at 952.
159
See id. at 951.
160
See id. This variation in price among geographical areas represents a
greater market break down best explained by the Lemon Theory and asymmetrical
information between the seller—the health care provider—and the buyer—the patient. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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care services” provided,161 patients are better able to evaluate where
to receive care from.162 This in turn “may lead high-cost providers
to lower prices” in order to remain competitive within the market.163
In line with strengthening patient choice, some have proposed
transitioning from a system of attribution164 to a model of self-enrollment in which the beneficiary chooses which ACO to associate
with.165 By giving the beneficiary the choice, the beneficiary is then
able to clearly decide which ACO he or she prefers. Rather than
leaving an ACO “[un]able to identify the patients for whom [it is]
responsible [for] until after the contract year ends,”166 this model
ensures that the ACO is clear as to who falls within its assigned population.167 One concern with giving the choice to the beneficiary is
161

Mongan et al., supra note 149, at 1511.
See Emanuel et al., supra note 149, at 951 (“Price transparency would allow consumers to plan ahead and choose lower-cost providers . . . .”); Mongan et
al., supra note 149, at 1511.
163
See Emanuel et al., supra note 149, at 951. One concern associated with
the price transparency is the potential for collusion; however, “this risk could be
addressed through aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws.” See id. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission released a joint statement regarding ACOs and antitrust law and enforcement. See Greaney, supra note 10, at
22–27.
164
Under the current system, ACOs are informed by CMS of tentative assignments on a quarterly basis and receive final assignments at the end of each performance year based on data from the previous year. See Valerie A. Lewis et al.,
Attributing Patients To Accountable Care Organizations: Performance Year Approach Aligns Stakeholders’ Interests, 32 HEALTH AFF. 587, 588–89 (2013) (describing Medicare’s “hybrid approach” to attribution, which includes quarterly
prospective assignments and a final year-end assignment); Nicholas Hodges, Accountable Care Organizations: Realigning the Incentive Problems in the U.S.
Health Care System, 26 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 114, 114 n.99 (2015)
(“Note that the literature often uses the word ‘attribution’ to mean the process of
assigning beneficiaries to an ACO.”).
165
See Paul B. Ginsburg & Alice M. Rivlin, Challenges for Medicare at 50,
373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1995 (2015) (“Shifting from an attribution model to
an enrollment model—in which beneficiaries choose to participate in an ACO and
have incentives to do so . . . —is the most effective way of engaging beneficiaries.”). But see generally Valerie A. Lewis et al., supra note 164, at 588 (discussing
research findings on two alternative methods of attribution to the current method
through Medicare: “prospective attribution” and “performance year attribution”).
166
Ginsburg & Rivlin, supra note 165, at 1994–95.
167
See supra note 165. This proposal may not be as effective in areas where
only one ACO is available to the beneficiary. However, on a global scale this
162
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the potential for fraud or coercion in attempting to attract a beneficiary to a certain ACO; however, much of this behavior would likely
be controlled under current fraud and abuse laws.168
As a result of improved price transparency and patient choice in
ACO provider, beneficiaries are empowered to take control of their
care. However, the effectiveness of both these proposals requires
that patients be more informed consumers. One proposal is to improve the health literacy of participants in the American health care
system.169 Health literacy is defined as “the degree to which a person

proposal will eliminate some of the confusion ACOs typically face regarding their
assigned population and will allow ACOs to better track costs. See Ginsburg &
Rivlin, supra note 165, at 1994–95.
168
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
But see Benjamin Holland Able, The Stark Physician Self-Referral Law and Accountable Care Organizations: Collision Course or Opportunity to Reconcile
Federal Anti-Abuse and Cost-Saving Legislation?, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 315 (2013);
BARRY D. ALEXANDER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 180, 201
(6th ed. 2014) (“On November 2, 2011, the OIG [Office of Inspector General], in
conjunction with CMS, issued an interim final rule with comment period establishing waivers of the Anti-Kickback Statute [and Stark Law] . . . to particular
arrangements involving ACOs under the Medicare shared savings program. While
not technically a safe harbor, the interim final rule establishes five waivers of application of the Stark law, the Anti-Kickback Statute, and the Civil Monetary Penalty provisions related to gainsharing and beneficiary inducements if certain conditions are met. According to the interim final rule, an arrangement need only fit
one wavier to be protected.”); Greaney, supra note 10, at 14; Wasif Ali Khan,
Accountable Care Organizations: A Response to Critical Voices, 14 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 309, 326–27, 332–38 (2012); Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1376–
77.
169
See generally Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The
Role of Health Literacy in Health Care Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 253 (2011) (providing a thorough description of the health literacy
strategy and its ability to induce cost savings in the American health care system).
A number of governmental agencies have researched and pursued health literacy
as a strategy for health promotion in the United States. See, e.g., COMM. ON
HEALTH LITERACY, INST. OF MED., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END
CONFUSION (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al. eds., 2004); Off. Disease Prevention &
Health Promotion, Health Literacy and Communication, HEALTH.GOV (Jan. 14,
2016), http://health.gov/communication/ [hereinafter Health Literacy Website].
This has manifested in health literacy being incorporated as a major objective of
Healthy People 2020, a “science-based, 10-year national [initiative] . . . for improving the health of all Americans.” See Off. Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, About Healthy People, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
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has the capacity to obtain, communicate, process, and understand
basic health information and services in order to make appropriate
health decisions.”170 Promoting health literacy among patients
would likely result in a more informed consumer population while
producing “significant cost savings for providers, insurers, and the
government.”171 By “empowering patients with better information
and decision-making skills,”172 patients are able to choose the ACO
and range of care most suitable to their needs, preferences, and financial ability.
III. PERSPECTIVE #2: QUALITY OF CARE AND THE METHODOLOGY
OF GRADING ACOS
The second perspective considers the quality performance
measures ACOs must meet in conjunction with the cost-saving
measures in order to receive a portion of the shared savings. Underlying these measures is what “high-quality care” means: “It is care
that assists healthy people to stay healthy, cures acute illnesses, and
allows chronically ill people to live as long and fulfilling a life as
possible.”173 This section will begin with a description of the quality
www.healthypeople.gov/2020/About-Healthy-People [hereinafter Healthy People Website]. See also Off. Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Health Communication and Health Information Technology, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV (Jan. 13,
2016), http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/health-com
munication-and-health-information-technology/objectives (Health literacy falls
under the major topic of “Health Communication and Health Information Technology” and is coded as “HC/HIT-1 Improve the health literacy of the population”).
170
Health Literacy Website, supra note 169 (select “About” on left column).
See also Clark, supra note 169, at 258–59 (providing various definitions for
“health literacy”).
171
Clark, supra note 169, at 272.
172
Id. at 274. Clark proposes several ways to improve health literacy among
Americans, including providing various forms and comprehension levels of information, patient coaching and patient-centered materials, and encouraging patient
questions and dialogue. See Clark, supra note 169, at 278–83.
173
THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING
HEALTH POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH, 111, 111 (5th ed. 2009). Bodenheimer
and Grumbach build further on this definition by explaining the various components of “high-quality care,” including “access to care,” “adequate scientific
knowledge,” “competent health care providers,” “separation of financial and clinical decisions,” and “organization of health care institutions to maximize quality.”
See generally id. at 111–16.
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performance measures used by the CMS to evaluate ACOs. It will
then consider whether these quality measures are effective in producing “quality care” for beneficiaries. It will end with a suggested
general reengineering of the quality measures used to evaluate
ACOs.
A. Grading the ACOs: The Four Domains of Review
In an effort to improve the quality of care provided by ACOs,
the CMS incorporated quality performance measures to the evaluation scheme of ACOs.174 ACOs must meet thirty-three quality performance measures set for a given year in order to share in any savings generated during that year.175 Based on nationally recognized
standards,176 these thirty-three quality measures span four domains
that chart the post-ACA path to “quality care.”177 The four domains
include: 1) patient/caregiver experience; 2) care coordination/patient safety; 3) preventive health; and 4) at-risk population, including diabetes, hypertension, ischemic vascular disease, heart failure,
and coronary artery disease.178
ACOs are required to thoroughly report on all thirty-three quality measures at each reporting period during a performance year.179
174

See generally Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85.
See id. at 1. These thirty-three quality measures were developed by a consortium of non-profit health organizations and institutions known as “measure
stewards” and include organizations like the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality and the National Committee on Quality Assurance. See CTRS. MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 2015 PROGRAM
ANALYSIS QUALITY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS NARRATIVE MEASURE
SPECIFICATIONS 1, 1–6 (2015) (providing a brief introduction on ACOs and the
quality measures, as well as detailed information regarding the measure and measure steward associated with the measure).
176
See generally PPACA, tit. III, subtit. A, pt. II, secs. 3013–14, 124 Stat. at
381–89; 42 C.F.R. § 425.500–.502 (2014); Barry G. Saver et al., supra note 155,
at 3 (“[T]hese measures are typically derived from the Healthcare Effectiveness
Data and Information Set (HEDIS), whose sponsor states they ‘were designed to
assess measures for comparison among health care systems, not measures for
quality improvement.’” (bold in original)).
177
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 1.
178
See id.
179
See id. A “performance year” consists of a twelve-month period, beginning
on January 1 of each year during the agreement period. See id. at 2. A “reporting
period” also consists of a twelve-month period, beginning on January 1 of each
year during the agreement period. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
175
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Reporting and data collection is done through a variety of methods,
including web interface, patient surveys, claims data, and data from
electronic health records.180 This data is then evaluated and used to
score ACOs across the measures and domains set for a performance
year.181 At the onset of the ACO program, payment was based on an
ACO completely and accurately reporting on all thirty-three quality
measures.182 However, the CMS is transitioning away from this payment model to a “pay for performance” model183 in which ACOs
must meet performance benchmarks—rather than reporting benchmarks—to share in any savings realized.184
The CMS sets a “Minimal Attainment Level” for each measure,
which is the minimum threshold an ACO must meet to earn points
in a given domain.185 The minimum attainment level was initially
set at 30% or the 30th percentile under the pay-for-performance
model, meaning the ACO being evaluated would need to perform

Guide to Quality Measurement for Accountable Care Organizations Starting in
2012: Agreement Period, Performance Year, and Reporting Period, CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 3 (“All quality measures will have a [twelve]month, calendar year reporting period, regardless of ACO start date.”). See also
id. at 2 (providing a breakdown of the performance year and corresponding reporting period in table form).
180
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 1.
181
See id. at 2, 3.
182
See id. at 2.
183
The “pay-for-performance” model—using “outcome measures tied to
pay . . . [used to move] from payment per procedure to true outcome-driven health
care”—is a major cost-saving and quality improving measure implemented
through various programs under the ACA. See generally Furrow, supra note 105,
at 860–62.
184
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 2. In Performance
Year 1, ACOs were able to meet quality performance measures by reporting on
all thirty-three measures. See id. In subsequent performance years, ACOs must
meet performance benchmarks for a greater share of the measures until the program completely transitions to all measures being evaluated on performance as
opposed to reporting. See id.
185
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 2–3; Hodges, supra
note 164, at 118; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Shared
Savings Program Quality Measure Benchmarks for the 2014 Reporting Year,
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 4 (Feb. 2015), https://www.cms.gov
/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/MSSP-QM-Benchmarks-2015.pdf [hereinafter Quality Measure Benchmarks 2014].
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better than the bottom 30% of providers evaluated.186 So long as the
minimum attainment level is met or passed on at least one measure
for each of the four domains, the ACO will earn points and likely be
eligible for a share of the savings generated.187 However, if the ACO
fails to meet the minimum attainment level, it will receive no points
for the given measure.188 Failure to meet the minimum attainment
level on at least 70% of the measures in each domain may result in
warnings or termination, as well as the ACO no longer qualifying
for shared savings.189
Each measure is scored on a scale from 0 to 2, except for one
measure—the Electronic Health Records measure—which is measured on a scale from 0 to 4.190 Points earned on this “sliding scale”
are based on an ACO’s actual level of performance on a given measure.191 Thus, the better an ACO performs on a given measure, the
more points an ACO is able to earn.192 The total points earned for
each measure within a given domain are then summed and divided
186
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 2; Hodges, supra note
164, at 118 (“CMS has set a minimum attainment level at the 30th percentile of
each performance benchmark.”). However, this percentage is set to increase over
time in order to drive quality up. See id. (“CMS intends to gradually raise the
minimum attainment level over time in order to drive quality improvements
amongst ACOs.”).
187
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 2–3. However, this
requires that the ACO meet the cost saving criteria as well. See id. at 3.
188
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 2.
189
See id. at 4.
190
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 3. The electronic
health records measure is weighted more heavily than the other measures in order
to promote the transition and use of electronic health records among ACOs. See
id. at 3; Quality Measure Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at 4 (“The [Electronic Health Records] measure is double weighted and worth up to 4 points to
provide incentive for greater levels of [Electronic Health Records] adoption.”).
191
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 3. It is important to
note that the thirty-three quality measures will be scored as twenty-three measures
as a result of composite measures, which combine several measures such that the
overall score is on an “all or nothing basis”—meaning each individual measure in
a composite measure must be met in order to earn the total points for the composite measure. See id. at 2; Quality Measure Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at
1.
192
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 3. For four of the
quality measures, a reverse sliding scale is used such that a lower score signifies
better performance and thus results in a higher score. See Quality Measure Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at 4.
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by the total possible points in the domain, resulting in a percentage
score for each domain.193 A final overall quality score for the ACO
is calculated by averaging the percentage score for each of the four
domains, which is then used to determine the amount of shared savings the ACO is entitled to.194
B. A+ or F? Reengineering the Quality Measures to Achieve
“Quality Care”
A brief review of the thirty-three measures and four domains reveal two major concerns, both of which may be resolved with one
global strategy. First, as noted earlier, a disconnect exists between
ACOs meeting the quality measures required of them and the subsequent cost savings that are supposed to be generated.195 This could
mean that the quality measures are not an effective cost-saving
tool.196 Second, the measures themselves appear disassociated and
myopic, seemingly lacking any general direction towards more holistic, long-term improvements in health in the United States.197
While the current measures are valuable in addressing major health
concerns in the United States,198 an improved framework of “highquality care” is needed, one aimed at improving the long-term health
status for the patient population the ACO serves rather than implementing temporary fixes.199
193
See Guide to Quality Performance, supra note 85, at 3; Quality Measure
Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at 5.
194
See Quality Measure Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at 5 (“[The] final
overall quality score for each ACO . . . will be used to determine the amount of
savings it shares or, if applicable, the amount of losses it owes.”); Guide to Quality
Performance, supra note 85, at 3. Each of the four domains are weighted equally
at 25%. See id. at 3 (Table 1 reflects the domain weight for each domain); Quality
Measure Benchmarks 2014, supra note 185, at 4 (Table 1 reflects the domain
weight for each domain).
195
See Part II, section B.
196
See id.
197
One article suggests that these quality measures “are often based on easily
measured, intermediate endpoints . . . not on meaningful, patient-centered outcomes; their use interferes with individualized approaches to clinical complexity
and may lead to gaming, overtesting, and overtreatment.” See Barry G. Saver et
al., supra note 155, at 1.
198
But see id. at 2 (“Some well-known quality measures do not perform as
intended, or may even be associated with harm . . . .”).
199
See Barry G. Saver et al., supra note 155, at 1–3.
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Because a disconnect between quality attainment and cost reduction currently exists in the ACO model,200 this shift to a longterm improvements model may, over time, result in more consistent
reductions in cost. Not only should this model define the goal and
strategy for achieving sustained, long-term improvements in health,
but it should also dictate the domains and measures chosen for rating
ACOs.201 This model would shift the ACOs’ focus from simply
meeting a random assortment of “quality” measures to aligning their
quality strategy towards a goal—namely meaningful long-term
health improvement for their patient population.
Several frameworks currently exist centered on producing longterm improvements in the general health status of Americans.202
Each defines the overlaying goal of the framework and details
measures used to determine whether the goal of long-term health
improvement is being met.203 One such framework is “Healthy People 2020,”204 a national program whose mission and measures are
updated every ten years in response to the shifting needs and current
status of health in the United States.205 Three other potential frameworks in the literature may be of value in determining the overall
mission, framework, and measures to evaluate ACOs.
One potential framework is a public health-centered framework206 that addresses current challenges in the provision of health
through “a combination of technological advances, more effective
clinical and administrative systems, and political commitment to invest in prevention and control” of patient health outcomes.207 Under
200

See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.
This process of creating quality measures by which to evaluate ACOs
should be done in a transparent manner—rather than in the bureaucratic, stakeholder-influenced manner currently used. See Barry G. Saver et al., supra note
155, at 2, 3 (“Such measures should merit public trust, earn the support of clinicians, and promote the empowerment of patients. Their development should be
open and transparent with careful attention to the best evidence of utility.”); supra
note 175–76.
202
See, e.g., Barry G. Saver et al., supra note 155; Healthy People Website,
supra note 169; Thomas R. Frieden, The Future of Public Health, 373 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1748 (2015).
203
See supra note 202.
204
Healthy People Website, supra note 169.
205
Id.
206
See Frieden, supra note 202, at 1749.
207
Id.
201
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this framework, domains and measures used to evaluate ACOs
would have “five essential characteristics: consistency, patient-centeredness, team-based care, registry-based information systems, and
continuous improvement in treatments and delivery.”208 This framework provides a broader, more holistic approach to addressing quality standards through the ACO model of care.
A second framework provides a set of “patient-centered” principles209 that could be used to develop measures that would result in
“meaningful health outcomes.”210 This framework dictates that a
quality measure must:
1. address clinically meaningful, patient-centered
outcomes;
2. be developed transparently and be supported by
robust scientific evidence linking them to improved
health outcomes in varied settings;
3. include estimates, expressed in common metrics,
of anticipated benefits and harms to the population to
which they are applied;
4. balance the time and resources required to acquire
and report data against the anticipated benefits of the
metric;
5. be assessed and reported at appropriate levels; they
should not be applied at the provider level when
numbers are too small or when interventions to improve them require the action(s) of a system.211
Measures created through this framework are intended to be evidence-based, ensuring that the measures themselves are effective
and justified.212

208

Id.
Barry G. Saver et al., supra note 155, at 3–6.
210
Id. at 4.
211
Id. (Box 1. Core Principles for Development and Application of Health
Care Quality Measures).
212
See id. at 3–6.
209
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A final framework that could be used to develop a more holistic
set of quality measures is the CMS Quality Strategy Goals and
Foundational Principles.213 These goals and principles guide CMS
activities so as “to optimize health outcomes by improving quality
and transforming the health care system.”214 While the six strategy
goals themselves are comprehensive in nature,215 it is the four foundational principles guiding each of these goals that brings the Strategy Goals together to meet a greater mission.216 Such a two-tiered
structure that includes particular goals driven by underlying principles is one that would be beneficial in conjunction with the development of measures to evaluate ACOs on quality performance.
IV. PERSPECTIVE #3: ACOS AND ACCESS TO CARE
The final perspective considers whether ACOs have enhanced
access to quality care. While critics argue that cost-saving measures
are creating barriers to needed care,217 a greater concern is whether
populations most in need are gaining access to the comprehensive
care of ACOs. One population—Medicaid beneficiaries—could
benefit most from the ACO model of care. Efforts by CMS to improve Medicaid beneficiary access to ACOs have already begun to
take effect, though greater action should be taken to incorporate this
community into the ACO programs.
213
See generally CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS QUALITY
STRATEGY 2016 1 (2016) [hereinafter CMS QUALITY STRATEGY 2016].
214
CMS QUALITY STRATEGY 2016, supra note 213, at 3.
215
See id. at 5 (“The CMS Quality Strategy goals reflect the six priorities set
out in the National Quality Strategy . . . .”). These six goals include: 1) Make care
safer by reducing harm caused in the delivery of care; 2) Strengthen person and
family engagement as partners in their care; 3) Promote effective communication
and coordination of care; 4) Promote effective prevention and treatment of chronic
disease; 5) Work with communities to promote best practices of healthy living;
and 6) Make care affordable. See id.
216
These four foundational principles include: 1) Eliminate Racial and Ethnic
Disparities; 2) Strengthen Infrastructure and Data Systems; 3) Enable Local Innovations; and 4) Foster Learning Organizations. See id. at 5–7.
217
See supra notes 197–98. See also Barry G. Saver et al., supra note 155, at
4 (stating that an Institute of Medicine report in 2015 “highlight[ed] how ‘many
measures focus on narrow or technical aspects of health care processes, rather
than on overall health system performance and health outcomes’ and [found] that
the proliferation of measures ‘. . . create[s] serious problems for public health and
for health care.’”).
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A. ACOs: The “Ivory Towers” of the U.S. Health Care
Industry?
It is undeniable that the ACO model of care has had an immediate impact on the delivery of care—despite certain flaws in the
model. However, the ACO model of care seems to create a metaphorical “ivory tower” of care by affording a luxury—quality care
at a lower cost—to certain beneficiaries of the American health care
system—namely Medicare beneficiaries and private payers.218
When considering the long-term impact of this “ivory tower” on improving the health status of Americans, solely catering to these two
groups is insufficient. Further, this “ivory tower” effectively blocks
one major group of beneficiaries from accessing the comprehensive
care offered by ACOs: Medicaid beneficiaries.219
Because the statutory formation of the ACO model of care only
provides for Medicare beneficiaries,220 the ACA left Medicaid beneficiaries relatively precluded from enjoying the comprehensive
care that ACOs promised to provide.221 However, such a strategy is

218

Lewis et al., supra note 25, at 1849 (“The coverage of ACOs varie[s] by
type of payer—21 percent of local areas were served by at least one Medicare
ACO, 13 percent were served by at least one private payer ACO, and 3 percent
were served by at least one Medicaid ACO (confined almost entirely to states that
launched Medicaid ACO projects: Oregon, Minnesota, and New Jersey).”); Stephen M. Shortell et al., Accountable Care Organizations: The National Landscape, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 647, 649 (2015) (“About half have a contract with a private payer, with 16 percent having a contract with both Medicare
and a private payer. Thirty-six percent have a contract with Medicare only.”).
219
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (statutorily creating the MSSP, which
caters only to Medicare beneficiaries).
220
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. But see KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
EMERGING MEDICAID ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF
MANAGED CARE 1, 2 (2012) (“The ACA also authorized a demonstration project
for the creation of pediatric ACOs within Medicaid and/or the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP). The demonstration project is currently unfunded, but
states have begun to plan and implement Medicaid ACO initiatives themselves.”)
221
John V. Jacobi, Multiple Medicaid Missions: Targeting, Universalism, or
Both?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 89, 106 (2015) (“The ACA created an ACO payment program in Medicare, but did not create a similar program
in Medicaid.”).
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short-sighted as “Medicaid disproportionately covers the poor, disabled, and elderly . . . .”222 Similarly, many of these Medicaid beneficiaries are people of color who are regularly denied access to
quality care—or care in general.223 In effect, because ACOs are statutorily formed to care for Medicare beneficiaries—as opposed to
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries—“[t]he process of creating
ACOs may reinforce racial or ethnic differences in sites of care,”224
as well as intensify existing disparities in health for racial and ethnic
minorities.225 While this likely was not the intention of the architects
of the ACA, such a statutory loophole disproportionately impacts
Medicaid beneficiaries who greatly need access to comprehensive
quality care. It is critical, however, that this statutory loophole be
addressed to ensure that all those who need health care are able to
access the benefits of the ACO model of care.
B. Medicaid and ACOs: An Opportunity for Partnership?
Several states have taken steps that effectively counteract this
large loophole in the ACO program, including Colorado, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Utah.226 The structure of these Medicaid ACOs vary
222

Id. See also KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 225, at 1 (“Medicaid is the
nation’s public health insurance program for low-income Americans, covering
close to 60 million children, families, seniors, and people with disabilities.”).
223
Craig Evan Pollack & Katrina Armstrong, Accountable Care Organizations and Health Care Disparities, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1706, 1706 (2011)
(“Racial/ethnic disparities in health are well documented in the United States.
These disparities arise, in part, because of differences in the site of care. Black
and white patients tend to receive care from different clinicians who work at different hospitals and in different health care systems.”); Ryan E. Anderson et al.,
Quality of Care and Racial Disparities in Medicare Among Potential ACOs, 29 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1296, 1296 (2014) (“Because care for racial and ethnic minorities is concentrated among physicians and hospitals with fewer resources, advanced provider groups ready to participate in ACO programs may disproportionately care for white patients.”).
224
Pollack & Armstrong, supra note 223, at 1706.
225
See Anderson et al., supra note 223, at 1296.
226
Virgil Dickson, Reform Update, States test Medicaid ACOs to cut costs,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 1, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20
140701/NEWS/307019965. In total, there are currently fifteen states with Medicaid ACO models of care; Jacobi, supra note 221, at 106 (“Experimental programs are growing in several states . . . built on the structure of coordinated care,
shared clinical decision-making among a large group of Medicaid providers, and
some form of reward for delivering high-quality care while containing cost.”);
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from state to state,227 though recent data shows that they all are effective.228 However, the common characteristic among the current
Medicaid ACOs is how they are formed; Medicaid ACOs have all
been legislatively created by states.229 This is a critical point to note
when considering the formation of Medicaid ACOs on a national
scale, as the politics of a given state legislature could drastically impact the creation of a Medicaid ACO, and, as a result, compromise
a Medicaid beneficiary’s ability to access comprehensive care.230
With this in mind, it would be prudent for the CMS to incentivize Medicaid ACOs through their current ACO programing rather
than leave it to each state legislature.231 Such a Medicaid ACO
KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 220, at 1, 2–5. See generally Douglas Hervey
et al., The Rise and Future of Medicaid ACOs, LEAVITT PARTNERS 1, 4 (Sept.
2015), http://cqrcengage.com/trinityhealth/file/tyuVip0U4gR/LeavittMedicaidA
COSept2015.pdf (Figure 1 mapping the states that have passed legislation for
Medicaid ACOs); Tricia McGinnis, A Unicorn Realized? Promising Medicaid
ACO Programs Really Exist, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2015/mar/unicorn-realized-medicaid-acos (describing each of the Medicaid ACOs).
227
See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 220, at 4; Dickson, supra note 226
(“The [Medicaid] models differ significantly from state to state.”); Hervey et al.,
supra note 226, at 4 (“[N]o two states’ initiatives are alike. States’ ACO experiments depend on their historical relationship with managed care and their own
unique challenges associated with their low-income and chronically ill populations. State ACOs differ in their organizational structures, governance, provider
eligibility requirements, covered populations, scope of services, required functions, payment models, and quality measures.”).
228
See McGinnis, supra note 226.
229
See Hervey et al., supra note 226, at 4 (“Despite the historical and anticipated growth of Medicaid ACOs, most states’ efforts are still relatively nascent
as they must undergo lengthy planning processes, accommodate differing stakeholder concerns, and navigate complex federal and state legislative and regulatory
requirements in order to implement a Medicaid ACO.”).
230
This point is exemplified by the recent trend of states refusing to expand
their Medicaid program following the landmark decision of National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (holding that “Congress is not free . . . to penalize States
that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing
Medicaid funding [for not expanding coverage].”). However, the reasoning there
may be indicative of the fact that Medicaid ACOs cannot be imposed on states.
See id. at 2607–08.
231
This strategy of incentivizing participation in the formation of state Medicaid ACOs should be done in a manner that does not punish states for not participating, as the ACA was thought to do through the expansion of the Medicaid
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model could simply mirror the current structure of the Medicare
ACO model in which ACOs are able to earn shared savings by improving the quality of care provided and decreasing the cost of
care.232 However, these Medicaid ACO programs would need to allow for variations among states based on demographics, needs, and
available funds.233 By incentivizing the formation of Medicaid
ACOs, the CMS—in partnership with participating states—could
help close this existing statutory gap in access to care for a vulnerable population that is desperately in need of high quality, comprehensive care.
CONCLUSION
As with any initiative, only time will tell whether the ACO
model of care will be able to effectuate the major changes it is designed to bring to the American health system. While this Comment
offers some criticisms and suggested solutions—based on a review
of the available literature—it should not be seen as a call to eliminate
the ACO model of care.234 Rather, this Comment intends to support
and build on the current conversation concerning the ACO model of
care, as well as offer strategies for continuously improving the
model. As the ACO model of care continues to be refined, policymakers and health care providers alike will likely be able to better
meet the desired balance embodied in the “Triple Aim.” However,
achieving this balance requires that all stakeholders work collaboratively to refine a model of care that promises to provide quality care
at a lower cost for more Americans. In many cases, it already has.

program in each state. See id. Incentivizing, without “blackmailing,” participation
in Medicaid ACOs would thus keep with the logic of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. See id.
232
See supra Part II.
233
See supra note 227.
234
See Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its
Growing Pains, The Concept Is Too Vitally Important To Fail, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1250, 1250 (2011) (“[N]one [of the criticisms] should serve to prevent the evolution of this [ACO] model, because the alternative to a fundamental restructuring
of how health care is delivered and paid for in the United States is likely to be a
type of indiscriminate cost cutting that will leave the nation with a damaged health
care system, reduced access to care services, and declining quality of care.”).

